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INTRODUCTION
An accidental moment of clarity emerged during Paul Clement’s
December 2016 oral argument rebuttal in the Supreme Court case
of Cooper v. Harris.1 Harris was the latest challenge to two North
Carolina congressional districts that the Court had repeatedly ex-
amined since its 1993 decision in Shaw v. Reno.2 Shaw established
the cause of action for “an unconstitutional racial gerrymander,”3
and Harris considered whether the North Carolina legislature
engaged in such gerrymandering by making race the “predominant
factor” in redistricting North Carolina’s Congressional District 12,
or whether its actions instead could be explained as a constitution-
ally permissible attempt to gain partisan advantage.4
Clement was arguing that the legislature’s choice to shift 75,000
African American voters, many living in Guilford County, from
neighboring districts into District 12 was not evidence of the legis-
lature impermissibly making race the predominant districting fac-
tor, but simply evidence of partisanship:
First of all, it’s all well and good to say they pulled in 75,000
African-Americans or hauled in all these African-Americans.
They were all Democrats, as well. And that’s why, even there, if
you had an alternative map that showed, oh, there’s a different
way to do Guilford County, and ... bring in Democrats and not
bring in African-Americans, then you’d have something.
But just the fact that they brought in a bunch of African-
Americans because they were trying to bring in Democrats is
about as interesting as the sun coming up in North Carolina,
because everybody agrees there’s about a 90 percent correlation
between race and partisan identity.5
1. Transcript of Oral Argument at 58, Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017) (No. 15-
1262). At the time it was argued, the case was known as McCrory v. Harris. Id. at 1. Pat
McCrory was North Carolina’s governor when the case was argued, see id., and Roy Cooper
was governor when the case was decided, see Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1455.
2. 509 U.S. 630, 633 (1993).
3. Id. at 633-34, 658.
4. Harris, 137 S. Ct. at 1463; id. at 1488 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
5. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 58.
2018] THREE UNEASY APPROACHES 1839
Clement’s point was, of course, correct—the most reliable Demo-
cratic voters by far in North Carolina are African American6—but
it subversively undermined not only his argument but also the en-
tire exercise in which the Court engaged. The idea that in southern
states, such as North Carolina, it is possible to separate consider-
ations of race from those of party is ludicrous. Not only do white and
African American voters in North Carolina tend to prefer different
candidates, white voters tend to prefer Republicans and, on an even
greater basis, African American voters tend to prefer Democrats.7
For example, in the final Elon Poll of North Carolina voters before
the 2016 presidential election, an astonishing 100 percent of Afri-
can American voters supported Hillary Clinton, while 67 percent of
white voters supported Donald Trump.8
Throughout the United States, but especially in the modern
American South, the situation is one of “conjoined polarization,” as
Bruce Cain and Emily Zhang label it: “The more consistent align-
ment of race, party, and ideology since 1965.”9 As they summarize
the social science literature on the phenomenon:
American politics has become decidedly more polarized in the
last two decades. By political polarization, we mean the persis-
tent and growing ideological gap between adherents of the two
major political parties.... 
Democrats and Republicans today can reliably be expected to
hold certain policy and ideological positions. Two decades ago,
partisan labels were much less predictive of the views that an
individual held.... 
Polarization along partisan lines also has a racial dimension.
The campaign, election, and reelection of President Obama
spawned significant academic research on the parallel growth of
racial and partisan polarization. Such racial polarization is
evident in President Obama’s election returns: in the 2008
election, he lost the white vote by 20%, but won with a nonwhite
margin of 62%.
6. ELON POLL, NORTH CAROLINA RACES TIGHTEN AS ELECTION DAY APPROACHES 11 (Oct.
23-27, 2016), https://www.elon.edu/e/CmsFile/GetFile?FileID=694 [https://perma.cc/6MDS-
E6E2].
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1.
9. Bruce E. Cain & Emily R. Zhang, Blurred Lines: Conjoined Polarization and Voting
Rights, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 867, 869 (2016).
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The roots of racial polarization run much deeper. The civil
rights movement divided the population on racial issues and
caused party attachments to form along racial lines. Such racial
polarization has not only caused African-Americans and other
minorities to more closely associate with the Democratic Party,
it has also had an effect on whites. Political scientists have found
a notable increase in the effects of racial resentment on white
partisanship from 1988 to 2000....
...
Racial sorting and party sorting trends have been closely
intertwined. Civil rights policies gave socially conservative white
Democrats reason to defect to the Republican Party. Immigra-
tion policies also enabled the nonwhite and non-European popu-
lation to grow and eventually enter a coalition with liberal
whites. At the same time, both parties became more ideologi-
cally consistent, with more within-party conformity in social
and economic policy. This undercut the ideological heterogeneity
that in the immediate post World War II era had limited the
polarization of activists, donors, and representatives in both
parties. The Democratic and Republican parties became more
ideologically consistent and racially distinctive.10
Although conjoined polarization emerged most strongly in the
last two decades, legal doctrine has not yet found a comfortable way
to deal with it, as the Harris case illustrates.11 In this Article, I con-
sider three ways legal doctrine can and does try to approach con-
joined polarization, and the problems with each approach. My own
preference is for the third approach, but it too has drawbacks.
Race or party is the first approach to conjoined polarization.12 In
this approach, a court’s task is to decide whether a case is “really”
about race rather than party, with certain legal consequences flow-
ing from the determination.13 Some of the racial gerrymandering
cases fit into this category.14 Building on an early racial gerryman-
dering case, Easley v. Cromartie (Cromartie II ), the courts’ task has
10. Id. at 872-74, 876 (footnotes omitted).
11. See Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1470-72 (2017).
12. See infra Part I.
13. Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party?: How Courts Should Think About Republican Efforts
to Make It Harder to Vote in North Carolina and Elsewhere, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 58, 71
(2014).
14. See, e.g., Easley v. Cromartie (Cromartie II), 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
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been to decide whether race or party predominated in drawing
district lines.15 If race predominated, the lines are impermissible
unless the state had a compelling reason to rely on race, but if par-
tisanship predominated, the districts are allowed.16 Beneath the
surface, this racial gerrymandering doctrine has allowed for par-
tisan and political fights over redistricting in the guise of discuss-
ing racial separation.17 The race or party divide also appears in
some Voting Rights Act section 2 cases; courts looking at discrimi-
natory effects of voting rules sometimes have considered whether
minority voters faced less opportunity to participate in the political
process because of their race (or ethnicity), or for partisan reasons.18
In jurisdictions where conjoined polarization is prevalent, a race or
party analysis can be nonsensical and lead to arbitrary results. It
also may undermine enforcement of the Voting Rights Act.
An alternative approach is to treat race as a proxy for party under
certain conditions.19 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit used this approach in a recent case involving the
constitutionality of a major North Carolina voting law, which im-
posed a strict voter identification requirement and made cutbacks
to other voting rules.20 The court, in striking the State’s law as a
violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, held that the state
legislature (the same one that drew the lines at issue in Harris)
acted with a racially discriminatory intent.21 The court reached this
conclusion despite finding no evidence of racial animus.22 The court
wrote that legislators relied upon racial data to achieve partisan
ends in designing this law, and that this reliance made party dis-
crimination a form of racial discrimination.23
The Supreme Court’s most recent racial gerrymandering case,
Cooper v. Harris, also moved the Court significantly in the direction
of race as party, especially when there was reliance on racial data
15. See id. at 241. Cromartie I was Hunt v. Cromartie (Cromartie I), 526 U.S. 541 (1999).
16. Hasen, supra note 13, at 71.
17. Id. at 69.
18. Id. at 66.
19. See infra Part II.
20. N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2016), cert.
denied, 137 S. Ct. 1399 (2017).
21. Id. at 219.
22. Id. at 233.
23. Id. at 214, 230.
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for partisan ends.24 This approach, while more realistic about con-
joined polarization than race or party, raises a host of new ques-
tions, such as whether Republican legislatures in areas of conjoined
polarization could ever roll back earlier easing of voting laws en-
acted by Democratic legislatures and administrators without risking
a court holding that the legislature engaged in intentional race
discrimination. It also means that a law that is illegal in North Car-
olina may be legal in Wisconsin, even if motivated by the same par-
tisan intent, because of the difference in racial makeup between the
two states.25
A third approach to conjoined polarization, suggested in footnotes
in the Fourth Circuit case,26 but advanced more fully by some schol-
ars, including Sam Issacharoff and me, seeks to de-emphasize a ra-
cial focus in these lawsuits.27 Under the party all the time approach,
courts shift toward policing partisan election laws more directly.
Race still matters in areas with conjoined polarization, but a legal
focus on the racial aspects of these disputes can make it even more
difficult to adjudicate these delicate disputes.28 A move toward party
all the time would prevent states from raising partisanship as a
defense to discrimination against minority voters.29 Party all the
time has two main drawbacks. First, it can obscure situations in
which race is more salient than party and needs direct redress from
the courts.30 Second, the approach injects courts further into the
political thicket, potentially leading to more partisanship in judicial
decision-making and lack of a principled stopping point for judicial
policing.31
The problem of conjoined polarization is real, and the three al-
ternatives demonstrate that it is hard to come up with the right set
of legal doctrines to properly take it into account. That the Court
24. See 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1476-77 (2017); infra notes 273-77 and accompanying text.
25. Compare Quick Facts: North Carolina (2016), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.
census.gov/quickfacts/NC [https://perma.cc/PPP7-HJ5E], with Quick Facts: Wisconsin (2016),
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/WI/PST045216 [https://
perma.cc/UJE7-HU2M] [hereinafter Wisconsin, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU].
26. See, e.g., N.C. State Conference of NAACP, 831 F.3d at 226 n.6.
27. See infra Part III.
28. See Hasen, supra note 13, at 61.
29. See id. at 62.
30. See infra Part III.B.
31. See infra Part III.B.
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continues to struggle with these issues is demonstrated in the
Court’s recent decision in the Harris case, in which a Court ma-
jority, led by Justice Elena Kagan, seemed to move in the direction
of the race as party proxy approach,32 while the dissenters, led by
Justice Samuel Alito, doubled down on the race or party approach.33
Harris may prove to be a short-term victory for voting rights
plaintiffs, however, and a more conservative Supreme Court could
move toward a fourth approach, to the victor goes the spoils, in which
the Court allows legislative majorities to impose their will despite
claims of racial or partisan discrimination or intent.
I. RACE OR PARTY
A. Background
The history of race, party, and redistricting in the United States
is a long and complex one, so below is a simplified overview to sit-
uate the race or party approach generally and its manifestation in
the racial gerrymandering and voting rights cases in particular.34
Consider, for example, a city with a city council made up of seven
seats. The city’s population is 60 percent white and 40 percent
African American, and there is racially polarized voting, with whites
preferring one set of candidates and African Americans preferring
another set of candidates. The city elects candidates at-large,
meaning everyone votes for all seven candidates. In these races, we
expect five white-preferred and zero African American-preferred
candidates on the council. If the African American voters are at
least somewhat geographically concentrated, it would be possible
to draw one or two districts (“majority-minority” or “minority op-
portunity” districts) in which African American voters could elect
their preferred candidates. The at-large system could be said to
“dilute” minority voters’ political power.
32. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1479 (2017).
33. Id. at 1496-97 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
34. I first explored the race or party question in more general terms in my article, Race
or Party?: How Courts Should Think About Republican Efforts to Make It Harder to Vote in
North Carolina and Elsewhere, Hasen, supra note 13.
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The passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act did not initially tackle
this problem of at-large voting.35 The Act’s initial aim was more
basic, eliminating first-generation barriers to voting such as literacy
tests.36 By 1969, the Supreme Court read section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act to require jurisdictions with a history of racial discrim-
ination in voting not to make changes in voting rules that made
protected minority voters worse off—the “nonretrogression rule”—
including changes to districting rules.37 These jurisdictions had to
submit their changes for “preclearance” to the United States De-
partment of Justice (DOJ) or a three-judge federal district court in
Washington, DC.38 A move from two minority opportunity districts
to one or none, for example, would be retrogressive and blocked by
the courts and the DOJ.39 Keeping an at-large voting system would
not trigger section 5 review, however, because there would be no
change from existing rules to submit for preclearance.40
Although constitutional doctrine was beginning to emerge in the
1970s to allow Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment challenges to
at-large voting systems as unconstitutional vote dilution and to
require jurisdictions to create minority opportunity districts,41 the
Supreme Court put a stop to this evolution in the 1980 case, City of
Mobile v. Bolden.42 The Court in City of Mobile held that, in such
constitutional challenges, plaintiffs must prove that an at-large
system would have both a discriminatory effect on minority voters
and that the city chose the system with a racially discriminatory
intent.43 Unless plaintiffs could show that the city enacted at-large
voting with the purpose to discriminate against minority voters, it
was immune from constitutional challenge.44
35. For background and detail, see DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN ET AL., ELECTION LAW 143-
257 (6th ed. 2017).
36. See id. at 215.
37. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 548-50 (1969).
38. Id. at 549-50.
39. See id.; see also Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976).
40. RICHARD L. HASEN, LEGISLATION, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, AND ELECTION LAW
281 (2014).
41. See generally White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S.
124 (1971); Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973), aff’d sub nom. E. Carroll
Par. Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976).
42. 446 U.S. 55, 78 (1980).
43. Id. at 67-68.
44. Id. After City of Mobile, the Court decided Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 627 (1982),
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In response to City of Mobile, Congress amended section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act in 1982 to allow for claims of vote dilution—and
other voting claims, discussed below—based solely upon proof of ra-
cially discriminatory effects, without requiring proof of racially dis-
criminatory intent.45 Section 2 allowed challenges to jurisdictions—
anywhere in the country, not just in jurisdictions covered by section
5—with racially polarized voting using at-large districts.46 It also
allowed challenges to jurisdictions already using districts, where
line-drawers may have “packed” or “cracked” populations of minor-
ity voters, diluting their political power.47 Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act, as interpreted in the Supreme Court’s 1986 case,
Thornburg v. Gingles, required the creation of minority opportunity
districts in at least some cases in which plaintiffs could demonstrate
racially polarized voting and that the minority group was large and
compact enough to be a majority in a single-member district.48
Further, once a jurisdiction covered under section 5 of the Act cre-
ated minority opportunity districts, it could not reduce the number
of such districts without running afoul of the nonretrogression
rule.49
Throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, the DOJ read sections
2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act broadly to require jurisdictions
subject to section 5 preclearance to create many minority oppor-
tunity districts.50 Sometimes the creation of these new districts
helped Democrats, but often they helped Republicans by concentrat-
ing Democratic voters into a smaller number of districts.51 At that
point in time, strong voting rights enforcement did not consistently
line up with the interests of a single political party.52
which seemed to soften the intent requirements.
45. Act of June 29, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (codified as amended at 52
U.S.C. § 10301 (Supp. III 2016)).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 478 U.S. 30, 44-45, 50-51 (1986). Once a plaintiff meets this threshold test, a court
must use a multifactor “totality of the circumstances” test to determine whether there is a
section 2 violation. Id. at 36-38, 36 n.4.
49. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 548-50 (1969).
50. For a critique, see ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, VOTING RIGHTS—AND WRONGS: THE ELUSIVE
QUEST FOR RACIALLY FAIR ELECTIONS 143-66 (2009).
51. Richard L. Hasen, Racial Gerrymandering’s Questionable Revival, 67 ALA. L. REV. 365,
365 (2015).
52.  See id.
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In the mid-1990s, the Supreme Court started reining in broad
DOJ interpretations of the Voting Rights Act, which were being
used to force covered jurisdictions to maximize the number of ma-
jority-minority districts.53 The Court accomplished this reining in
both by narrowing statutory constructions of sections 2 and 5 of the
Voting Rights Act54 and by recognizing a new cause of action in
Shaw for “an unconstitutional racial gerrymander.”55
B. Unconstitutional Racial Gerrymandering in Times of
Conjoined Polarization56
In the 1990s round of state legislative redistricting in North Car-
olina, a jurisdiction then partially covered by section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act, self-interested Democrats reacted to the DOJ’s demands
to create an additional majority-minority legislative district by pass-
ing a plan that simultaneously created the required number of such
districts, protected Democratic incumbents, and maximized the
number of Democratic seats.57
To accomplish these goals, the mapmakers drew some very oddly
shaped majority-minority districts, including a new Congressional
District 12 that tied together disparate populations of African Amer-
ican voters along the I-85 freeway corridor.58 Republicans initially
challenged the legislative districting plan as a partisan gerryman-
der.59 The claim failed, following the fate of other partisan gerry-
mandering claims.60 Opponents of the redistricting plan then filed
a new claim, arguing that the redistricting was an unconstitutional
racial gerrymander.61 Importantly, the claim was not that the plan
diluted the white vote or anyone else’s vote.62 The plaintiffs were
53. See id. at 365, 368.
54. See generally Reno v. Bossier Par. Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000); Reno v. Bossier Par.
Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471 (1997).
55. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 633-34 (1993).
56. The next few pages draw from my article, Racial Gerrymandering’s Questionable
Revival. See Hasen, supra note 51, at 369-72. 
57. LOWENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 35, at 337-38.
58. Id.
59. See generally Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392 (W.D.N.C. 1992) (three-judge court), aff’d,
506 U.S. 801 (1992).
60. See id. at 399.
61. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 636 (1993).
62. Id. at 641.
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pushing a view of a color-blind Constitution and election process,
arguing that the plan separated voters on the basis of race in viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause.63
In Shaw v. Reno, the Supreme Court accepted the argument,
creating a cause of action for an unconstitutional racial gerryman-
der.64 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s decision for the Court stressed
the odd shape of the district, and said that the odd shape showed
voters being separated on the basis of race, in violation of the Con-
stitution.65 The Court held such separation could not be sustained
unless it satisfied strict scrutiny and remanded the case for further
consideration of the justification.66 Justice O’Connor explained in a
later case that the new claim protected against “expressive harms”
in which the government sends an unconstitutional message by
separating voters on the basis of race without adequate justifi-
cation.67
63. Id. at 641-42.
64. Id. at 647-49.
65. Here is the key language from Shaw establishing the nature of the perceived injury:
Put differently, we believe that reapportionment is one area in which appear-
ances do matter. A reapportionment plan that includes in one district individ-
uals who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by
geographical and political boundaries, and who may have little in common with
one another but the color of their skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance to
political apartheid. It reinforces the perception that members of the same racial
group—regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the community in
which they live—think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer
the same candidates at the polls. We have rejected such perceptions elsewhere
as impermissible racial stereotypes. By perpetuating such notions, a racial ger-
rymander may exacerbate the very patterns of racial bloc voting that majority-
minority districting is sometimes said to counteract.
The message that such districting sends to elected representatives is equally
pernicious. When a district obviously is created solely to effectuate the perceived
common interests of one racial group, elected officials are more likely to believe
that their primary obligation is to represent only the members of that group,
rather than their constituency as a whole. This is altogether antithetical to our
system of representative democracy.
Id. at 647-48 (citing Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630-31 (1991); Holland
v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 484 & n.2 (1990)).
66. Id. at 657-58.
67. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 984 (1996) (“We are aware of the difficulties faced by
the States, and by the district courts, in confronting new constitutional precedents, and we
also know that the nature of the expressive harms with which we are dealing, and the
complexity of the districting process, are such that bright-line rules are not available.”). The
idea originated with Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre
Districts,” and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno,
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Later cases in the 1990s fleshed out the theory and workings of
the new racial gerrymandering claim. Although Justice O’Connor
continued to focus on the shape of the district,68 other Court conserv-
atives shifted the focus of the new cause of action to motive.69 In
Miller v. Johnson, the Court held that race could not be the “pre-
dominant ... factor” in redistricting without compelling justifica-
tion.70 The Miller Court concluded that the Georgia legislature had
an impermissible predominant racial motive and remanded under
the strict scrutiny standard to determine whether the State’s ap-
parent decision to make race predominate the redistricting process
was justified by a compelling state interest.71 The harm in Miller ap-
peared to be the same as in Shaw, but the proof moved from district
shape to legislative motive.72 It was not a motive to engage in racial
discrimination, but one of racial separation.73
To talk of Georgia’s “predominant” motive in Miller as separating
voters on the basis of race was odd, however, because the State was
simply drawing the number of majority-minority districts required
by the DOJ to obtain section 5 preclearance.74 If anything, Georgia’s
predominant motive was to obtain preclearance of its plan by pro-
posing the number of majority-minority districts the DOJ de-
manded.75 The placement of the districts appeared motivated not by
race but by party and incumbency considerations.76 Nonetheless,
the Court found race to be the predominant factor.77
The new test led lower courts to search for an impermissible legis-
lative motive78: a difficult, if not impossible, task when examining
the votes of a multimember body, but a task made especially
92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 506-07 (1993).
68. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 928-29 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 916 (majority opinion).
70. Id. at 920.
71. See id. at 923-28.
72. Id. at 923-24.
73. Id. at 910-11.
74. For an excellent analysis on these points, see Daniel Hays Lowenstein, You Don’t
Have to Be Liberal to Hate the Racial Gerrymandering Cases, 50 STAN. L. REV. 779, 798-801
(1998).
75. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 921.
76. Id. at 942 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 923-27 (majority opinion).
78. See, e.g., Theriot v. Parish of Jefferson, 185 F.3d 477, 484 (5th Cir. 1999).
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difficult by the emergence of conjoined polarization between race
and party.
Most importantly for our purposes, in 2001, the Court decided
Cromartie II, the fourth time a North Carolina racial gerryman-
dering case reached the Supreme Court within a decade.79 In Crom-
artie II, Justice O’Connor and the four more liberal members of the
Court rejected a challenge to North Carolina’s latest redistricting
plan for Congressional District 12 after concluding that party dom-
inance, not race, was the predominant factor in drawing the chal-
lenged district lines.80
It is not as though the Court in Cromartie II was unaware of the
creeping conjoined polarization. Indeed, Justice Stephen Breyer,
writing for the Court, noted that “[c]aution is especially appropriate
in this case, where the State has articulated a legitimate political
explanation for its districting decision, and the voting population is
one in which race and political affiliation are highly correlated.”81
Throwing caution to the wind nonetheless, the Court engaged in
an excruciatingly detailed analysis of the trial court’s factual find-
ings to see if race or politics predominated in creating the latest in-
carnation of District 12, an analysis that was necessary if the Court
was to overcome the trial court’s factual finding of political predomi-
nance under the very deferential “clearly erroneous” standard of
review.82 The Court concluded that the trial court clearly erred in
analyzing the evidence, and that race rather than politics predomi-
nated.83 It set forth the applicable test in future race or party cases
as follows:
In a case such as this one where majority-minority districts (or
the approximate equivalent) are at issue and where racial
identification correlates highly with political affiliation, the
79. See Cromartie II, 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
80. Id. at 258.
81. Id. at 242; see also id. at 243 (“‘Given the undisputed evidence that racial identification
is highly correlated with political affiliation in North Carolina, these facts in and of them-
selves cannot, as a matter of law, support the District Court’s judgment.’ See Vera, 517 U.S.,
at 968 (O’Connor, J., principal opinion) (‘If district lines merely correlate with race because
they are drawn on the basis of political affiliation, which correlates with race, there is no
racial classification to justify.’”)).
82. See id. at 241-58.
83. Id. at 258.
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party attacking the legislatively drawn boundaries must show
at the least that the legislature could have achieved its legiti-
mate political objectives in alternative ways that are comparably
consistent with traditional districting principles. That party
must also show that those districting alternatives would have
brought about significantly greater racial balance.84
Since Cromartie II, racial gerrymandering cases have become far
less frequent. One reason may be that redistricters got smart and
started drawing more compact majority-minority districts (and hid-
ing any evidence, in emails or other discoverable correspondence, of
a predominant motive in using race in redistricting). Another key
factor is likely the changed role of the DOJ. Because of a number of
cases reining in the DOJ’s preclearance powers to require the
creation of additional majority-minority districts, the DOJ was no
longer pushing jurisdictions to create more of them.85 Without such
pressure, jurisdictions could avoid both DOJ liability and potential
problems in the courts through the creation of too many of these
districts.86
By the 2010s, the groups litigating the racial gerrymandering
cases switched sides as conjoined polarization became dominant in
the American South and as Republican legislatures controlled the
latest round of redistricting.87 Republican legislators drew district
lines to pack minority voters into a smaller number of districts to
help Republican legislative chances, but they did not always dilute
minority votes enough to allow for successful section 2 cases.88 Dem-
ocrats and minority voters claimed racial gerrymanders; Republican
legislators defended their redistricting maps by arguing either that
they had to pack more minority voters in these districts to comply
with sections 2 or 5 of the Voting Rights Act, or that they were
acting to help their party, not on the basis of race.89 In the middle of
litigation over this round of redistricting, the Supreme Court
84. Id.
85. See Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117
YALE L.J. 174, 200 n.105 (2007).
86. See id.
87. For a helpful overview, see Justin Levitt, Quick and Dirty: The New Misreading of the
Voting Rights Act, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 573 (2016).
88. See id. at 598-99, 609.
89. Id. at 606-07, 609.
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essentially killed section 5 preclearance in its 2013 decision in
Shelby County v. Holder.90
The 2014 Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama case
was typical.91 Black and Democratic legislators, voters, and groups
challenged Alabama’s state legislative redistricting plan, raising a
vote-dilution challenge under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and
racial and partisan gerrymandering claims.92 Alabama had packed
African American voters, and the state defended its packing on
grounds it had to do so to comply with section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act.93 The lower court divided 2-1 in rejecting the plaintiffs’ claims.94
The Supreme Court agreed to hear only the racial gerrymander-
ing claim.95 It sided with the plaintiffs, rejecting Alabama’s argu-
ment that it had to pack African American voters into districts to
comply with the now-moribund section 5.96 The majority, in an opin-
ion written by Justice Stephen Breyer for the four more liberal Jus-
tices and Justice Anthony Kennedy, held that the lower court erred
in considering whether Alabama’s legislative redistricting plan as
a whole was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander.97 The majority
sent the case back to a lower court to consider the issue on a dis-
trict-by-district basis.98 It strongly suggested that the Alabama leg-
islature’s heavy focus on racial data in drawing district lines for
some districts constituted an unconstitutional racial gerrymander.99
In the Supreme Court’s most recent case on this question, the
Court held that North Carolina’s Republican legislature similarly
relied impermissibly upon compliance with the Voting Rights Act to
90. See 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013).
91. 135 S. Ct. 1257 (2015).
92. Id. at 1262.
93. Id. at 1263.
94. See Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1227 (M.D. Ala. 2013)
(three-judge court), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 1257 (2015).
95. Ala. Legislative Black Caucus, 135 S. Ct. at 1262.
96. Id. at 1274.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1265.
99. Id. at 1264-68, 1274. On remand, the trial court found that fourteen of the challenged
districts were racial gerrymanders, but upheld two under strict scrutiny. Ala. Legislative
Black Caucus v. Alabama, 231 F. Supp. 3d 1026, 1033, 1348-49 (M.D. Ala. 2017) (three-judge
court). The partially dissenting judge found an additional twelve districts were racial gerry-
manders. Id. at 1404 (Thompson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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excuse racial gerrymanders.100 As discussed in the Conclusion below,
although the Court in Harris was unanimous that one of the two
North Carolina congressional districts failed on these grounds, it
divided badly about the other congressional district, which present-
ed a Cromartie II race or party question.
The most charitable thing to say about the current state of racial
gerrymandering law is that it is a big mess. Thanks to the continued
application of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, states with large
minority voting populations and racially polarized voting—that is,
all of the states in the American South—must take race into ac-
count in drawing district lines or face potential Voting Rights Act
liability.101 And since the 1993 Shaw case, a state risks constitu-
tional liability when its necessary race consciousness slides into race
predominance.102
It would be difficult enough for states with sizable minority pop-
ulations to achieve this kind of goldilocks nirvana without conjoined
polarization, and I would argue—and have argued in earlier schol-
arship—not worth the candle, because all the Court is protecting is
an unproven “expressive harm” that does nothing to protect the
actual allocation of political power in the states.103 But in times of
conjoined polarization, the exercise of parsing racial from partisan
intent is nonsensical and counterproductive. This explains why
courts are dividing on these issues, often with Democratic-appointed
judges much more likely to find that Republican legislatures en-
gaged in a racial gerrymander than Republican-appointed judges.
The rational strategy for Republican legislatures is to dilute
Democratic voting strength as much as possible without incurring
liability under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act—and, before
Shelby County, to do so while obtaining section 5 preclearance, a
requirement that presumably will not be in place for the post-2020
round of redistricting. Packing and cracking groups of minority
voters, who are by far the most reliable Democratic voters in the
South, and overpopulating and underpopulating districts within
100. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1472 (2017).




103. Hasen, supra note 51, at 384.
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the confines of the one person, one vote rule, helps Republicans
achieve legislative dominance.104 The rational strategy for Demo-
cratic legislatures is to spread minority voters strategically to give
Democrats the greatest number of seats without running afoul of
Voting Rights Act requirements. It is impossible in this heated po-
larized environment to say precisely when racial consciousness
slides into racial predominance. And avoiding race consciousness is
impossible for states that want to avoid potential liability under
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.105
Chief Justice John Roberts tried to make the point about the
difficulty of the predominance inquiry during times of conjoined po-
larization in the oral argument in a recent Virginia racial gerryman-
dering case, Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Board of Elections.106 He
asked plaintiffs’ attorney Marc Elias a hypothetical question involv-
ing the need to nominate people for a board who must come from a
city of at least five hundred thousand people and who must come
from California.107 Which factor predominates—the population
requirement or the California requirement?108 The Chief Justice
said this is a situation where neither factor predominates, with the
suggestion that this hypothetical explained the dilemma in racial
gerrymandering claims.109 The Chief Justice’s example is only
partially useful because there are many states aside from California
with cities containing populations over five hundred thousand.110
The hypothetical would have been stronger if modified as follows:
people nominated for a board must come from a state with at least
thirty million people and must come from California. Because
California is the only state with at least thirty million people,111 it
104. See id. at 382.
105. The targeting of only Black Democrats when there are enough white Democrats to
target could be such evidence, but in these cases there are usually not enough white
Democrats to go around.
106. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4-6, Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137
S. Ct. 788 (2017) (No. 15-680).
107. Id. at 4.
108. Id.
109. See id. at 4-6.
110. See Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for Incorporated Places of 50,000 or
More, Ranked by July 1, 2016 Population, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2017), https://factfinder.
census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk [https://perma.cc/
RU3W-8KD3].
111. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Florida Passes New York to Become the Nation’s
1854 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:1837
is nonsensical to ask which factor predominates. It is not that there
are two criteria that both must be satisfied; it is that they are the
same criterion.
The added irony to this debate over predominance is that in the
early years of the Shaw claims, liberals and minority voting rights
advocates rejected the legitimacy of the cause of action, seeing it as
a way for conservatives to stall the creation of minority opportunity
districts.112 Now, with the complete partisan transformation in the
South, some on the left embrace the cause of action to aim at white
Republicans.113 These cases are battles over vote dilution, one which
necessarily affects people by both race and party because of con-
joined polarization.114
In other words, the racial gerrymandering cause of action has
been repurposed for new partisan warfare in cases in which the vote
dilution claim under section 2 is not strong enough to stand on its
own.115 As Paul Clement put it at the oral argument in Bethune-Hill,
“People are bringing junior varsity dilution claims under the guise
of calling them Shaw claims, and I think it’s really distorted the
law.”116 He saw the plaintiffs in Virginia as pursuing an opportunis-
tic action to force a new redistricting now that Virginia’s governor
is a Democrat.117 The strategy is risky: if the Court agrees with
plaintiffs that choosing racial targets in drawing district lines
constitutes predominance, this could make it much harder to draw
section 2 minority opportunity districts that could withstand racial
gerrymandering claims.118
Third Most Populous State, (Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/
2014/cb14-232.html [https://perma.cc/5DR8-HYL7] (listing California as the most populous
state with a population of approximately 38.8 million, followed by Texas with a population of
approximately 26.9 million).
112. See Hasen, supra note 51, at 370.
113. See Richard L. Hasen, Resurrection: Cooper v. Harris and the Transformation of
Racial Gerrymandering into a Voting Rights Tool, 1 ACS SUP. CT. REV. 105, 122-23 (2017).
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017).
116. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 106, at 43.
117. Id. at 54.
118. See Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1272 (2015) (declining
to “express a view on the question of whether the intentional use of race in redistricting, even
in the absence of proof that traditional districting principles were subordinated to race,
triggers strict scrutiny”).
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Republicans meanwhile have been disingenuous in defending
these districts, feigning adherence to the Voting Rights Act or
claiming they are merely acting as partisans and that partisanship
has nothing to do with race.119 To claim that a partisan gerrymander
or a packing of minority voters—even if not done to the extent to
trigger section 2—only coincidentally affects minority voters is flat
wrong; if the Democratic party favors minority interests in these
state legislative bodies and in Congress, and if Republicans mini-
mize Democratic power in these bodies, minority power is weak-
ened.
After the three-judge court in Harris found the challenged con-
gressional districts constituted a racial gerrymander,120 the North
Carolina legislature drew new district lines, expressly eschewing re-
liance on any racial data and declaring that they were engaged in
a partisan gerrymander.
As [North Carolina] Representative Lewis stated, “I acknowl-
edge freely that this would be a political gerrymander.... [W]e
want to make clear that we ... are going to use political data in
drawing this map. It is to gain partisan advantage on the map.
I want that criteria to be clearly stated and understood.... I’m
making clear that our intent is to use—is to use the political
data we have to our partisan advantage.”121
The State drew ten of thirteen congressional districts to favor
Republicans, in a state where party registration is roughly even
between Democrats and Republicans.122
Plaintiffs then filed a new lawsuit challenging the districts as
partisan gerrymanders, a claim the three-judge court rejected,123
and that is currently pending in the Supreme Court.124 And so we
have come full circle. The first attack on Shaw was a failed partisan
119. See Harris v. McCrory, 159 F. Supp. 3d 600, 616 (M.D.N.C. 2016), aff’d sub nom.
Cooper v. Harris, 137. S. Ct. 1455 (2017).
120. Id. at 627.
121. Harris v. McCrory, No. 1:13-cv-949, 2016 WL 3129213, at *2 (M.D.N.C. June 2, 2016)
(per curiam) (three-judge court) (citations omitted), appeal docketed sub nom. Harris v.
Cooper, No. 16-166 (U.S. Aug. 3, 2016).
122. Harris, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 620.
123. Harris, 2016 WL 3129213, at *2.
124. See Jurisdictional Statement, Harris v. Cooper, No. 16-166 (U.S. Aug. 3, 2016).
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gerrymandering claim, followed by a racial gerrymandering one.125
We now see a racial gerrymandering claim preceding the partisan
gerrymandering claim.126 It blinks reality to see these as two sepa-
rate and independent claims.
C. Section 2 Vote Dilution Cases in Times of Conjoined
Polarization
Although the artificial judicial bifurcation of race and party has
been most prominent in the racial gerrymandering cases, bifurca-
tion also has begun to appear in some Voting Rights Act section 2
cases, with the potential to undermine the strength of the Act going
forward.127
Recall that Congress substantially rewrote section 2 in 1982 as a
response to the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Mobile v. Bolden
requiring proof of discriminatory intent in constitutional vote di-
lution cases.128 Section 2 created an “effects” test, or “results” test,
which aimed to ensure that voting rights plaintiffs would not need
to prove discriminatory intent to succeed.129 Voting rights advocates
initially used section 2 against vote dilution, applying the Gingles
framework.130 In more recent years, however, voting rights advo-
cates have also brought section 2 suits against strict voter identifi-
cation and other voting and registration rules, cases involving what
Professor Daniel Tokaji has dubbed “the new vote denial.”131
Section 2 provides in part that
[n]o voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard,
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State
or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to
125. Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392 (W.D.N.C. 1992) (three-judge court), aff’d, 506 U.S. 801
(1992).
126. See Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1478 (2017).
127. See infra Part I.D.
128. See Act of June 29, 1986, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (codified as amended at 52
U.S.C. § 10301 (Supp. III 2016)); 446 U.S. 55, 67-68 (1980).
129. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
130. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 36-38 (1986).
131. See Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting
Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689 (2006).
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vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of [language
protection] guarantees.132
In both the vote dilution and vote denial contexts, there has been
some question about the extent to which section 2 required proof of
causation.133 The language of the statute itself bars not all vote di-
lution or vote denial, but only the “denial or abridgement” of voting
rights “on account of race.”134 However, what if factors other than
race account for the denial or abridgement of the right to vote?
A plurality of Justices in Gingles took the position that causation
was irrelevant to the section 2 inquiry,135 meaning it did not matter
if other factors, such as political party affiliation, could explain why
protected minority voters had less opportunity than others “to par-
ticipate in the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice.”136 To the plurality, requiring proof of causation would im-
permissibly move section 2 closer to the rejected intent test of City
of Mobile.137 Other Justices in Gingles, across several opinions, took
issue with the plurality’s causation analysis, leaving the issue
somewhat open.138
In League of United Latin American Citizens v. Clements, a 1993
challenge under section 2 to Texas’s use of county-wide (rather than
single-member) districts for electing trial judges, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, noted the
split in the Supreme Court on the issue of causation.139 The court
wrote that a majority of Justices in Gingles would not find a section
2 vote dilution violation if partisanship, rather than race, caused
white voters and minority voters to prefer different candidates for
office.140
Following this analysis, the Clements court majority rejected vote
dilution claims in most of the challenged Texas counties, holding
132. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (Supp. III 2016).
133. See Tokaji, supra note 131, at 704-05.
134. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a).
135. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 63 (plurality opinion).
136. See 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b).
137. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 71-73 (plurality opinion).
138. See LULAC v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 855-59 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (discussing
differences among separate opinions in Gingles on the causation question).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 858 n.26.
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that partisan affiliation, rather than race, best explained divergent
voting patterns in those counties.141 The Court disagreed with the
voting rights plaintiffs who thought that allowing the State to defeat
a section 2 claim with partisanship data would bring the intent
standard back into vote dilution cases through the back door.142 The
court also rejected the argument that “the Republican and Demo-
cratic Parties are proxies for racial and ethnic groups in Texas,”143
and therefore a “distinction between ‘racial vote dilution’ and ‘po-
litical defeat at the polls’ should not control, ... [because] ‘partisan
politics’ is ‘racial politics.’”144
Among other things, the court noted that:
[W]hite voters constitute the majority of not only the Republican
Party, but also the Democratic Party, even in several of the
counties in which the former dominates. In Dallas County, for
example, 30-40% of white voters consistently support Demo-
crats, making white Democrats more numerous than all of the
minority Democratic voters combined.145
Section 2 “is implicated only where Democrats lose because they
are black, not where blacks lose because they are Democrats.”146 The
court pointed to this fact, and the support of minority candidates by
party members of each party, as a reason for treating race and party
as separate categories, even while acknowledging that “[m]inority
voters, at least those residing in the contested counties in this case,
have tended uniformly to support the Democratic Party.”147
Since the Fifth Circuit decided the Clements case, conjoined
polarization has only increased in the State of Texas, rendering the
factual premise that race and party can be separated in Texas even
more dubious. According to 2010 data from the Cooperative Con-
gressional Election Study, which considered only those registered
141. Id. at 861 (“Because the evidence in most instances unmistakably shows that diver-
gent voting patterns among white and minority voters are best explained by partisan affil-
iation, we conclude that plaintiffs have failed to establish racial bloc voting in most, but not
all, of the counties.”). 
142. Id. at 861-62.
143. Id. at 860.
144. Id. (emphasis added).
145. Id. at 861.
146. Id. at 854.
147. Id. at 860.
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voters who identify as a Democrat or a Republican (and excluded
those who do not state a party affiliation), 67 percent of white voters
in Texas identified as Republican, and 33 percent as Democrat; in
Dallas County, the figures were 60 percent Republican and 40
percent Democrat.148 Even when one takes into account those who
did not state a party preference, white support for Democrats in
Dallas County falls to 28 percent.149 In contrast, 10 percent of
African American voters and 38 percent of Hispanic voters in Texas
identified as Republican, compared to 90 percent of African Amer-
icans and 62 percent of Hispanic voters as Democrats.150 In Dallas
County, 13 percent of African Americans and 12 percent of Hispan-
ics identified as Republicans, compared to 87 percent of African
Americans and 88 percent of Hispanics as Democrats.151 Because
white voters made up 72 percent of all voters in the State of Texas
and 63 percent in Dallas County, it is not surprising that the overall
number of white Democrats is larger than the number of Black or
Hispanic Democrats. Self-identifying Democratic voters are 54
percent white in Texas and 47 percent white in Dallas County.152
While some courts considering section 2 cases have not gone so
far as Clements, many other courts have considered the reasons for
white bloc voting as part of the totality of the circumstances section
2 analysis.153 Most recently, Fifth Circuit Judge Jerry Smith,
148. CCES Common Content 2010, COOPERATIVE CONG. ELECTION STUDY, https://dataverse.
harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=hdl:1902.1/17705 [https://perma.cc/6H75-29RK].
149. Email from Professor Eitan Hersh to author (Jan. 27, 2017) (on file with author) (pro-
viding data generated from Cooperative Congressional Election Study).
150. Id.
151. Including registered voters who do not state a party preference, the figures are as
follows: 42 percent of white voters in Texas identify as Republican, and 20 percent as Dem-
ocrat (the rest do not identify as either party); in Dallas County, the figures are 42 percent
Republican and 28 percent Democrat. In contrast, 7 percent of African American voters and
25 percent of Hispanic voters identify as Republican, compared to 61 percent of African Amer-
icans and 41 percent of Hispanic voters as Democrats. In Dallas County, 9 percent of African
Americans and 6 percent of Hispanics identify as Republicans, compared to 60 percent of
African Americans and 45 percent of Hispanics as Democrats.
152. Id.
153. See Christopher S. Elmendorf et al., Racially Polarized Voting, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 587,
609-19 (2016); Ellen Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings Un-
der Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982: Final Report of the Voting Rights Initiative,
University of Michigan Law School, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 643, 670-72, 671 n.138 (2006);
Elizabeth M. Ryan, Note, Causation or Correlation? The Impact of LULAC v. Clements on
Section 2 Lawsuits in the Fifth Circuit, 107 MICH. L. REV. 675, 682-86 (2009); see also Cain &
Zhang, supra note 9, at 890 (commenting on Clements that “[i]f section 2’s prohibition against
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dissenting as part of a three-judge district court in a long-running
and high profile case involving Texas’s 2010 round of redistricting,
relied upon Clements, and an earlier version of this Article, in
concluding that partisanship, not race, explained Texas’s gerryman-
dering of state House districts.154
The issue has also gained new traction as section 2 litigation has
turned from vote dilution to vote denial cases. The causation issue
is especially difficult in the vote denial context, where one cannot
simply apply the Gingles framework by looking at racially polarized
voting and the number of minority voters redistricting authorities
could place in reasonably compact districts.155 The Supreme Court
has not yet weighed in on whether and how section 2 may be used
in vote denial cases, and it recently turned down a petition to review
the Texas voter identification case at an interim stage, a petition
that would have helped to clarify the vote denial standards.156
Commentators appear to agree that, in the vote denial context,
some kind of causation requirement is necessary; otherwise, any
voting law that has a disparate impact on minority voters poten-
tially would violate section 2—even a law as basic as one requiring
voter registration. Professor Tokaji has suggested “a three-part test
[considering] the disparate impact of a challenged burden on voting,
its connection to social and historical conditions (including but not
limited to intentional discrimination), and the state’s asserted in-
terests.”157 On this last step, the state’s asserted interests, he argued
that “[w]hile fraud prevention and cost savings may be considered,
vote dilutions of minorities becomes interchangeable with a prohibition against vote dilutions
of Democrats, it will face strong resistance from the federal judiciary”).
154. See Perez v. Abbott, No. SA-11-CV-360, 2017 WL 1450121, at *79 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 20,
2017) (three-judge court) (Smith, J., dissenting) (“Professor Hasen presents three possible
approaches that the Supreme Court could adopt: (1) ‘race or party’; (2) ‘party as race’; and (3)
‘party all the time.’ Professor Hasen is least fond of the first, although, as I will discuss, that
is the exegesis most consonant with Texas’s electoral landscape and, more importantly, is the
methodology that the en banc Fifth Circuit has announced without using that nomencla-
ture.”).
155. See Daniel P. Tokaji, Applying Section 2 to the New Vote Denial, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 439, 445-46 (2015); see also Janai S. Nelson, The Causal Context of Disparate Vote
Denial, 54 B.C. L. REV. 579, 595-96 (2013).
156. Chief Justice Roberts, in a statement respecting the denial of certiorari review in the
case, noted that both intent and effect issues remained to be litigated in the lower courts and
that review might be appropriate when the case concluded. Abbott v. Veasey, 137 S. Ct. 612,
613 (2017).
157. Tokaji, supra note 155, at 441.
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partisan motivations should not be allowed to justify voting burdens
given the correlation between race and party.”158 Professor Tokaji
argued against considering partisanship a legitimate interest to
justify a potentially discriminatory law because of the problem of
conjoined polarization.159
Despite Professor Tokaji’s warning, the bifurcation of race and
party resurfaced in the challenge to Texas’s voter identification law.
The Fifth Circuit, again sitting en banc, recently held in Veasey v.
Abbott that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that
Texas’s strict voter identification law, which imposed greater bur-
dens on minority voters, who tended to be poorer and less likely to
have one of the acceptable forms of photographic identification for
voting, violated section 2 of the Voting Rights Act because of its
discriminatory effects.160 The court sent the case back to the trial
court to reconsider whether the law was passed with discriminatory
intent, holding that the trial court looked at too wide a set of evi-
dence in evaluating that claim.161
In her partial dissenting position in Veasey, joined by four other
judges, Judge Edith Jones argued that Texas’s enactment of the
voter identification law could be explained by partisanship, not race:
158. Id. at 441-42. Professor Pamela Karlan says it is an affirmative reason to strike the
law down, as addressed in Part II below. See Pamela S. Karlan, Turnout, Tenuousness and
Getting Results in Section 2 Vote Denial Cases, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 763, 786 n.123 (2016).
159. Tokaji, supra note 155, at 488-89. Tokaji writes:
As Professor Richard Hasen observes, race and party often coincide, with African
Americans, Latinos, and (to a lesser extent) Asian Americans generally leaning
Democratic. Given the correlation between race and party, legislators can easily
serve partisan interests by making it more difficult for a racial group to vote. It
is therefore wrong to conceive of race and party as mutually exclusive reasons
for a voting practice. The overriding concern with voter ID and other barriers to
voting is that they make it more difficult for racial minorities to vote, thereby
making it easier for Republican candidates to vote. The core problem is that
elected officials from one party are suspected of making it more difficult for
racial minorities to vote in order to achieve partisan ends, but without leaving
a paper trail that would document discriminatory intent. Far from being mu-
tually exclusive, racial motivations for suppressing the vote reinforce, and are
practically indistinguishable from, partisan ones where (as is typically the case)
the affected racial group tends to favor candidates of one party. In these cir-
cumstances, a desire to favor one’s party should not excuse voting practices with
a discriminatory effect on a racial group.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
160. 830 F.3d 216, 272 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 612 (2017).
161. Id. at 231-35.
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The legislative history ... shows that the struggle over [the
voter identification law] centered on partisanship, not race.
Partisanship, however, is not racism, nor is it a proxy for racism
on this record....
...
... The law reflects party politics, not racism, and the majority
of this court—in their hearts—know this.162
Judge Jones did not directly tie this argument to Clements, but it
is easy to see how the argument could be extended through a section
2 causation analysis in a vote denial case.
Instead, Judge Jones made the point to refute any potential find-
ing that Texas acted with racially discriminatory intent, and, on this
point, she echoed an argument Texas itself made in a recent Texas
redistricting case. In that case, Perez v. Abbott, a three-judge court,
on a 2-1 vote, held that portions of Texas’s redistricting plan for con-
gressional and state House districts violated section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act and were unconstitutional racial gerrymanders.163 In
briefing for the long-running case, Texas argued its intent for draw-
ing certain district lines stemmed from partisanship, not race, with
only an “incidental” effect on race:
DOJ’s accusations of racial discrimination are baseless. In
2011, both houses of the Texas Legislature were controlled by
large Republican majorities, and their redistricting decisions
were designed to increase the Republican Party’s electoral pros-
pects at the expense of the Democrats. It is perfectly constitu-
tional for a Republican-controlled legislature to make partisan
districting decisions, even if there are incidental effects on mi-
nority voters who support Democratic candidates.164
Texas’s argument follows a statement the Supreme Court made in
a 1999 racial gerrymandering case from Cromartie I: “[A] jurisdic-
tion may engage in constitutional political gerrymandering, even if
162. Id. at 302-03 (Jones, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
163. No. SA-11-CV-360, 2017 WL 1787454, at *78-79 (W.D. Tex. May 2, 2017) (three-judge
court); see also Perez v. Abbott, No. SA-11-CV-360, 2017 WL 1450121, at *14 (W.D. Tex. Apr.
20, 2017) (three-judge court).
164. Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs and the United States Regarding Section 3(c) of the
Voting Rights Act at 19, Perez v. Texas, No. 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR (W.D. Tex. Aug. 5,
2013) (footnote omitted).
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it so happens that the most loyal Democrats happen to be black
Democrats and even if the State were conscious of that fact.”165
D. Implications and Critiques
Whether considering predominant motive, intent, or effect, in
redistricting or vote denial cases, the bifurcation of race and party
in the context of conjoined polarization threatens to undermine the
Voting Rights Act and voting rights protections. It also obscures con-
cerns about the political power effects of gerrymandering efforts
through a quixotic quest for legislative motive.
Bifurcation is based upon a fiction that race and party are un-
correlated.166 In fact, conjoined polarization means that they are
correlated, because the Democratic Party is more responsive to
minority voters’ interests than the Republican Party.167
This is not to say that there are not cases clearly falling on the
race or party side of the line. With about a third of white voters
being Democrats in states with conjoined polarization, it is some-
times impossible to see if Republican legislative actions targeted
only African American (or Latino) Democrats, rather than white
Democrats. Even that, however, presents a more difficult case.
Witness the supposed attempt of Alabama Republicans to try to
eliminate white Democratic officeholders in an attempt to make
Alabama voters think of the Democratic Party as the “Black
Party.”168 Such a strategy would allow partisan Republicans to
piggyback on the private racism of white Alabama voters, and it is
impossible to say if such a strategy is really about race or party.169
Similarly, a state could supposedly act in a purely partisan way
without looking at racial data, but because all know of the high cor-
relation between race and party, it is hard to see how this would
avoid race consciousness. Further, states with sizable minority pop-
ulations must be race conscious in passing voting rules to assure
165. 526 U.S. 541, 551 (1999).
166. Cf. Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas M. Spencer, Administering Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act After Shelby County, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2143, 2172-75 (2015) (arguing
that a Voting Rights Act section 2 violation may be established presumptively by evidence of
an extremely high correlation between race and ideology or partisanship).
167. See id. at 2172-73, 2173 n.138.
168. On the dispute over this claim, see Hasen, supra note 51.
169. Id. at 380.
1864 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:1837
they are not running afoul of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
Still, it is possible that going forward, improvements in voter data
and technology will allow legislatures to target a political party
more directly, and with less reliance on racial data or conscious-
ness.170
II. RACE AS PARTY
A. The Race as Party Cases
The Fifth Circuit in the Clements case, and Judge Jones in her
partial dissent in the Fifth Circuit’s Veasey case, rejected the view
that race and party can be proxies for one another, viewing parti-
sanship and racial discrimination as two discrete categories.171 In
Veasey, Judge Jones insisted that the other judges who disagreed
with her “in their hearts ... know” that these disputes are all about
“party politics, not racism.”172
The remark prompted a response from Judge Gregg Costa, who
issued a separate opinion partially concurring and partially dis-
senting in Veasey:
A judge who agrees with Judge Jones’s dissent that “partisan-
ship, not race,” is a likely reason why the Texas Legislature
enacted [its voter identification law] can thus still conclude that
the law was enacted with a discriminatory purpose. If that
desire for partisan advantage (or any other underlying motiva-
tion) leads a legislature to select a “course of action at least in
part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon
an identifiable group,” that is enough. This different starting
point for assessing the discriminatory purpose claim—that is, a
mistaken premise that the record has to support a finding of
170. See Christopher S. Elmendorf, From Educational Adequacy to Representational Ade-
quacy: A New Template for Legal Attacks on Partisan Gerrymanders, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1601, 1650 (“These datasets have made it possible for campaigns to generate or purchase
predictions for each registered voter of the probability that the voter will turn out in an elec-
tion, support a particular candidate or political party, give money, or respond in a specified
fashion to a campaign communication.”).
171. See Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 302 (5th Cir. 2016) (Jones, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 612 (2017); LULAC v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831,
861 (5th Cir. 1993).
172. Veasey, 830 F.3d at 303.
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outright racism—perhaps explains why today’s opinions take
such widely divergent views of the evidence.173
Judge Costa’s statement reflected an alternative view of how to
view the fact of conjoined polarization. Instead of race or party, it is
race as party, where the use of race can serve as a proxy for achiev-
ing partisan aims. The argument is not that partisanship is equiva-
lent to racism, as Judge Jones (mis)characterized it, but that the
two factors are so inextricably linked under conditions of conjoined
polarization that to discriminate on the basis of one is to discrimi-
nate on the basis of the other. Put in the language of intent, it is to
treat knowledge that one is acting with the substantial certainty of
causing a result as equivalent to acting with purpose.174 And it
stands in contrast to the Supreme Court’s statement in Cromartie I
that a state being conscious of conjoined polarization is not enough
to make the case for racial intent.175
The most prominent exposition of the race as party position came
in North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory (NC
NAACP), the recent Fourth Circuit opinion reviewing North Caro-
lina’s strict voting law, commonly known as HB 589.176 The state
legislature passed HB 589 soon after the Supreme Court’s Shelby
County decision freed North Carolina from submitting changes for
preclearance.177 Among other things, the law imposed a strict voter
identification requirement, cut back on the days of early voting be-
fore elections, eliminated same-day voter registration, banned the
counting of votes cast by a voter in the wrong precinct even for those
173. Id. at 336 (Costa, J., dissenting in part) (citations and footnote omitted). The court
majority also rejected Judge Jones’s argument on race and party being distinct, but it did not
go as far as Judge Costa. Id. at 241 n.30 (majority opinion).
174. See Garratt v. Dailey, 304 P.2d 681, 682 (Wash. 1956) (treating knowledge to a sub-
stantial certainty as equivalent to purpose as sufficient intent for an intentional tort); Garratt
v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091, 1093-94 (Wash. 1955); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR
PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 1(AM. LAW INST. 2010) (defining intent as including purpose
or knowledge to a substantial certainty).
175. See 526 U.S. 541, 551-52 (1999). That statement was made in the context of a predom-
inant motive analysis of racial gerrymandering, and not a search for racially discriminatory
intent. See id.
176. See HB 589, 2013 Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013); 831 F.3d 204, 216-17, 216 n.2
(4th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1399 (2017).
177. N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 3d 320, 498 (M.D.N.C.
2016), rev’d, 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1399 (2017). Forty of North
Carolina’s 100 counties were covered jurisdictions. See id.
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races in which the voter was eligible to vote, and ended the practice
of preregistering voters.178 Voting rights groups and the United
States government filed cases in federal court, raising both con-
stitutional and Voting Rights Act claims.179 Among the arguments
plaintiffs raised in the consolidated case was that North Carolina
enacted its law with racially discriminatory intent, which violated
both section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.180 Such intent would provide the predicate under section 3 for
putting North Carolina, again, under a preclearance regime.181
As the cases were pending, North Carolina softened its voter iden-
tification law.182 The district court refused to put any of the chal-
lenged provisions on hold pending a trial on the merits, a decision
reversed in part by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, and then reversed again for the 2014 elections by
the Supreme Court.183 The district court then held two trials
considering voluminous evidence and issued a mammoth ruling
rejecting all of the plaintiffs’ arguments, including the argument
that North Carolina enacted its law with racially discriminatory
purpose.184 The trial court viewed North Carolina as having a non-
discriminatory, good government purpose in passing the law.185 It
further determined that the fact that North Carolina sought data
on the impacts of some provision of the law on different racial
groups did not provide evidence of intentional racial discrimination,
but instead, was explainable on nondiscriminatory grounds, namely
the need to be race conscious to assure compliance with the Voting
Rights Act and the Constitution.186
The Fourth Circuit in NC NAACP reversed the trial court, hold-
ing the court committed clear error in rejecting the plaintiffs’
argument that North Carolina passed HB 589 with racially dis-
criminatory intent.187 Rather than seeing the state legislature as
178. Id. at 340.
179. Id. at 348.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See id. at 344-45.
183. Id. at 349-50.
184. Id. at 527-31.
185. Id. at 501-02.
186. Id. at 490.
187. N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 233 (4th Cir. 2016), cert.
2018] THREE UNEASY APPROACHES 1867
passing the law on nondiscriminatory grounds, the appellate court
viewed the evidence as suggesting only partisan grounds explained
it.188 And the court then equated partisan grounds to racial grounds:
“Although the new provisions target African Americans with almost
surgical precision, they constitute inapt remedies for the problems
assertedly justifying them and, in fact, impose cures for problems
that did not exist.”189
The court gave a detailed explanation for treating partisanship as
a proxy for race discrimination. It began by noting that the court
could only reverse a finding on intentional discrimination for clear
error, citing Cromartie II.190 The court then explained the Arlington
Heights factors for determining when a government body engaged
in intentional racial discrimination, which requires a sensitive,
multifactor inquiry into direct and circumstantial evidence of racial
intent and a shift of the burden to the government body to give
nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions.191 It noted that racially
polarized voting has increased in recent years in jurisdictions pre-
viously covered by section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, and while ra-
cially polarized voting itself did not prove racially discriminatory
intent, “it does provide an incentive for intentional discrimination
in the regulation of elections.”192
The court then set out its views on race as a proxy for party dis-
crimination:
Using race as a proxy for party may be an effective way to
win an election. But intentionally targeting a particular race’s
access to the franchise because its members vote for a particular
party, in a predictable manner, constitutes discriminatory pur-
pose. This is so even absent any evidence of race-based hatred
and despite the obvious political dynamics. A state legislature
acting on such a motivation engages in intentional racial
denied, 137 S. Ct. 1399 (2017).
188. See id.
189. Id. at 214.
190. Id. at 219-20 (citing Cromartie II, 532 U.S. 234, 243 (2001)).
191. See id. at 220-21 (citing Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977)).
192. Id.
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discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and
the Voting Rights Act.193
The court, citing cases in which other courts found North Carolina
engaged in voting rights violations, held the trial court clearly erred
in concluding that the evidence of North Carolina’s conduct since
the 1980s did not demonstrate racially discriminatory intent.194
Further:
The district court failed to take into account these cases and
their important takeaway: that state officials continued in their
efforts to restrict or dilute African American voting strength well
after 1980 and up to the present day. Only the robust protec-
tions of § 5 and suits by private plaintiffs under § 2 of the Voting
Rights Act prevented those efforts from succeeding. These cases
also highlight the manner in which race and party are inex-
orably linked in North Carolina. This fact constitutes a critical—
perhaps the most critical—piece of historical evidence here.195
The court wrote that:
[W]hether the General Assembly knew the exact numbers, it
certainly knew that African American voters were highly likely,
and that white voters were unlikely, to vote for Democrats. And
it knew that, in recent years, African Americans had begun reg-
istering and voting in unprecedented numbers. Indeed, much of
the recent success of Democratic candidates in North Carolina
resulted from African American voters overcoming historical
barriers and making their voices heard to a degree unmatched
in modern history.196
193. Id. at 222-23.
194. Id. at 225.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 225-26. Further:
The record makes clear that the historical origin of the challenged provisions in
this statute is not the innocuous back-and-forth of routine partisan struggle that
the State suggests and that the district court accepted. Rather, the General
Assembly enacted them in the immediate aftermath of unprecedented African
American voter participation in a state with a troubled racial history and ra-
cially polarized voting. The district court clearly erred in ignoring or dismissing
this historical background evidence, all of which supports a finding of dis-
criminatory intent.
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The Fourth Circuit then turned to the history of the passage of
HB 589, seeing evidence that the State enacted the law for partisan
reasons, and concluding that “[t]he district court erred in accepting
the State’s efforts to cast this suspicious narrative in an innocuous
light.”197 It viewed the legislature’s use of racial data as much more
pernicious than the district court did.198
The court concluded that North Carolina engaged in intentional
racial discrimination in passing the law with a partisan aim, even
if it harbored no racial animus:
Our conclusion does not mean, and we do not suggest, that
any member of the General Assembly harbored racial hatred or
animosity toward any minority group. But the totality of the cir-
cumstances—North Carolina’s history of voting discrimination;
the surge in African American voting; the legislature’s knowl-
edge that African Americans voting translated into support for
one party; and the swift elimination of the tools African Ameri-
cans had used to vote and imposition of a new barrier at the first
opportunity to do so—cumulatively and unmistakably reveal
that the General Assembly used [the law] to entrench itself. It
did so by targeting voters who, based on race, were unlikely to
vote for the majority party. Even if done for partisan ends, that
constituted racial discrimination.199
It concluded that in light of the intentional discrimination, the
challenged part of HB 589 could not be enforced.200 The court then
Id. at 226-27.
197. Id. at 228.
198. The court wrote:
This data revealed that African Americans disproportionately used early
voting, same-day registration, and out-of-precinct voting, and disproportionately
lacked DMV-issued ID. Not only that, it also revealed that African Americans
did not disproportionately use absentee voting; whites did. [It] drastically re-
stricted all of these other forms of access to the franchise, but exempted absen-
tee voting from the photo ID requirement. In sum, relying on this racial data,
the General Assembly enacted legislation restricting all—and only—practices
disproportionately used by African Americans. When juxtaposed against the
unpersuasive non-racial explanations the State proffered for the specific choices
it made, ... we cannot ignore the choices the General Assembly made with this
data in hand.
Id. at 230 (citations omitted).
199. Id. at 233.
200. Id. at 239. One judge dissented as to the enforceability of the voter identification
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declined to use section 3 of the Voting Rights Act to put North Car-
olina back under preclearance: “Such remedies ‘[are] rarely used’
and are not necessary here in light of our injunction.”201 The court
did not explain whether the same result would apply if the State
did not use racial data in creating its law, but given conjoined po-
larization and the state legislature’s knowledge of the racial effects
of partisan laws, it well could have.
In Veasey, the Fifth Circuit’s view on discriminatory intent did
not go as far as the Fourth Circuit’s in NC NAACP. The Fifth Cir-
cuit sent the case back to the trial court, which had initially found
that Texas acted with racially discriminatory intent, to reconsider
the question using a stricter set of criteria to measure motive, but
suggesting that the court could well find motive.202 It left open the
potential for a race as party proxy argument, but did not resolve it.
The district court again found discriminatory intent on remand, and
an appeal on this point is expected.203
Even under these narrower Fifth Circuit rules for discerning
intent, however, a federal district court judge, bound by Veasey,
recently found that the City of Pasadena, Texas, engaged in in-
tentional racial discrimination against Latino voters.204 The City
enacted a plan for city council elections that moved from eight
single-member districts to six districts and two at-large districts,
“eliminat[ing] one Hispanic-majority district and prevent[ing]
Latino-backed candidates from winning a City Council majority.”205
In the judge’s factual findings in Patino v. City of Pasadena, the
court found that in the city’s campaign to change the districting
system, “Pasadena officials used partisan terms as proxies for race
or racial terms.”206 For example:
provision after it had been softened. See id. at 242-44 (Motz, J., dissenting as to Part V.B of
the majority opinion).
201. Id. at 241 (alteration in original).
202. See Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 230-43 (5th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 612
(2017).
203. See Veasey v. Abbott, No. 2:13-CV-193, 2017 WL 1315593, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 10,
2017), stay granted by 870 F.3d 387 (5th Cir. 2017).
204. See Patino v. City of Pasadena, 230 F. Supp. 3d 667, 729 (S.D. Tex. 2017).
205. Manny Fernandez, In Texas, a Test of Whether the Voting Rights Act Still Has
Teeth, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/15/us/in-texas-a-test-of-
whether-the-voting-rights-act-still-has-teeth.html [https://perma.cc/76E7-WRBN].
206. Patino, 230 F. Supp. 3d at 703-04.
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In preparing a mailing list to target voters to receive cam-
paign materials in favor of changing to the 6-2 map and plan,
[Pasadena Director of Community Relations Richard] Scott
wrote a campaign vendor and recommended using Mayor Isbell’s
campaign list from a previous campaign but asked the vendor
first to “pull out Hispanic names” from the list. At trial, Mr.
Scott testified that when he wrote “pull out Hispanic names,” he
meant to direct the vendor to pull out the names of Democratic
voters. When asked by the court why he said “Hispanics” if he
meant “Democrats,” Mr. Scott testified that he did not know, but
then testified that he thought of “Hispanic” as a proxy for Dem-
ocratic voters and “Anglos” as a proxy for Republican voters. Mr.
Scott testified that he did not know how many Latinos received
the mailers he sent through Citizens for Positive Change.207
The trial court used this finding and others in holding that partis-
anship was a proxy for race. Relying on the Fourth Circuit’s decision
in NC NAACP, and the majority and Judge Costa’s opinion in
Veasey, the court found racially discriminatory intent, which served
as the basis not only to find a section 2 violation but also to put the
City of Pasadena back under preclearance through section 3 of
Voting Rights Act:
The same reasoning [as in NC NAACP] applies here....
Mr. Scott’s directive to “pull out the Hispanic names” from
campaign lists for Proposition 1 provides a clear example. The
City attempts to characterize Mr. Scott’s statements as race-
neutral because they were “premised on [the] belief that most
Hispanics in Pasadena vote as Democrats and that Democratic
groups were opposing the charter change.” That explanation is
not inconsistent with, and does not lessen, the evidence showing
the intent to discriminate against Latinos in changing the
district map. The word Mr. Scott chose was not Democrats but
Hispanics. Pasadena officials supporting Proposition 1, and do-
ing so on behalf of Mayor Isbell and at the direction of his ap-
pointed officials, understood race and party as interchangeable
proxies. By clearly and explicitly intending to diminish Latinos’
voting power for partisan ends, Pasadena officials intentionally
discriminated on the basis of race.208
207. Id. at 704 (citations omitted).
208. Id. at 727-28 (citation omitted).
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Finally, Professor Karlan went further than Professor Tokaji on
the relevance of evidence of partisan intent in a section 2 vote deni-
al case. While Professor Tokaji argued that such evidence should
not be considered as a permissible justification to enact a voting
law,209 Professor Karlan “would actually go further. Not only can
partisan motivations not justify restrictions, they should in fact
count as evidence that the restrictions violate the results test [of
section 2].”210 The statement places Professor Karlan firmly in the
race as party camp.
B. Implications and Critiques
Race as party has much to commend it, at least compared to race
or party. It avoids an artificial and indefensible distinction between
race and party under conditions of conjoined polarization.211 It
recognizes that when Republicans discriminate against Democrats
under these conditions, and Democrats are much more likely to
209. See Tokaji, supra note 155, at 441-42.
210. Karlan, supra note 158, at 786 n.123; see also id. at 789 (“But even if a court were to
find that partisan considerations did not rise to that level, it must treat those motivations
under the section 2 results test as evidence that the jurisdiction’s policy is tenuous and there-
fore, under the totality of the circumstances, partisan motivation cuts in favor of finding
section 2 liability.”).
211. For an early articulation of this position, see Richard H. Pildes, Principled Limitations
on Racial and Partisan Redistricting, 106 YALE L.J. 2505, 2545 (1997).
[T]he mix of partisan and racial considerations, and the further internal inter-
relationship between the two, makes a predominant motive test that seeks to
isolate the contribution of racial considerations all the more unwieldy. This in-
tertwining of race and politics has at least two implications for constraints on
redistricting. First, it is often unrealistic to act as if the two aims can be dis-
entangled and one assigned predominance. Second, even if these aims could be
distinguished, many of the criticisms of race-consciousness that lead to extreme
forms of districting could also be levelled at partisan goals that contribute to
such districting. If the Court is going to develop constitutional constraints on ex-
cessive manipulations of the districting system, it would be more manageable,
more consistent with the way motives mix complexly in this area, and leave the
Court less open to charges of selective concern for the integrity of territorial
districting were the Court to develop more general and universal constraints on
district manipulation. Constraints that took the form of more general principles
would necessarily focus less on searching for specific motives and more on
specifying objective limitations on how far district manipulation could go, with
less concern for judgments about the reasons driving it.
Id.
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represent the interest of minority voters, then discrimination on
the basis of party hurts minority voters.212
Race as party also follows the common sense view reflected in the
common law—but denied by the Supreme Court in Cromartie I 213—
that when it comes to intent, having the purpose to do something
and acting with the knowledge that a consequence is substantially
certain to occur should be treated similarly. Indeed, in a 2006
Supreme Court case, League of United Latin American Citizens v.
Perry, the Supreme Court held that efforts to gerrymander Texas
Congressional District 23, so as to prevent the emerging Latino
majority from electing a candidate of their choice, violated section
2 of the Voting Rights Act.214 Justice Kennedy for the Court wrote:
In essence the State took away the Latinos’ opportunity because
Latinos were about to exercise it. This bears the mark of inten-
tional discrimination that could give rise to an equal protection
violation. Even if we accept the District Court’s finding that the
State’s action was taken primarily for political, not racial, rea-
sons, the redrawing of the district lines was damaging to the
Latinos in District 23.215
Race as party is in line with the Supreme Court’s observation in
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney that:
“Discriminatory purpose” ... implies more than intent as volition
or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the de-
cisionmaker, in this case a state legislature, selected or reaffir-
med a particular course of action at least in part “because of,”
not merely “in spite of,” its adverse effects upon an identifiable
group.216
Or as Judge Alex Kozinski wrote in the context of a suit over the
redistricting of Los Angeles County supervisorial districts, a legis-
lative body can engage in intentional racial discrimination even
212. See id.; see also Cain & Zhang, supra note 9, at 872-74.
213. Cromartie I, 526 U.S. 541, 546 (1999).
214. 548 U.S. 399, 441-42 (2006).
215. Id. at 440 (citing Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 508 (2006)).
216. 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (citing United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 179
(1977) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
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when harboring no animus to the racial or ethnic minority but act-
ing purely in its political self-interest.217 It is intentional racial dis-
crimination when:
[E]lected officials engage[ ] in the single-minded pursuit of
incumbency [and] run roughshod over the rights of protected
minorities....
...
...Where, as here, the record shows that ethnic or racial
communities were split to assure a safe seat for an incumbent,
there is a strong inference—indeed a presumption—that this
was a result of intentional discrimination, even absent ...
smoking gun evidence.218
One serious objection to treating race as a proxy for party under
conditions of conjoined polarization is that it creates a kind of “one-
way ratchet,” or nonretrogression principle, under section 2. Thus,
when Democrats pass laws that make it easier to register and vote,
those laws are not subject to judicial scrutiny, but when Republicans
do so under conditions of conjoined polarization, they may run afoul
of the protections of the Voting Rights Act.219 This does not mean
that every Republican voting law would be illegal, but it would limit
the liability-free options for Republicans to make what would
otherwise be considered legitimate policy choices.
The other objection is that the rule likely will have disparate
applications across the United States. By all accounts, partisan
politics in Wisconsin is just as heated as it is in North Carolina.220
And Wisconsin too passed a strict voter identification law, which
217. Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 778 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J.,
concurring and dissenting in part).
218. Id. at 778-79.
219. In its petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court in NC NAACP, the State of
North Carolina argued that the Fourth Circuit’s standard for discriminatory intent imposed
a nonretrogression standard, essentially reinstituting Shelby County through the back door.
Petition for a Writ for Certiorari and Volume I of the Appendix at 16-19, North Carolina v.
N.C. State Conference of NAACP, 137 S. Ct. 1399 (2017) (No. 16-833).
220. See the excellent series, Dividing Lines, by Craig Gilbert in the Journal Sentinel,
beginning with, Craig Gilbert, Democratic, Republican Voters Worlds Apart in Divided
Wisconsin, J. SENTINEL (May 3, 2014, 4:58 PM), http://archive.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/
democratic-republican-voters-worlds-apart-in-divided-wisconsin-b99249564z1-255883361.
html [https://perma.cc/N4BX-RF5R].
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litigants challenged in the courts.221 But Wisconsin has a much
smaller minority population—it is just 6.6 percent African Ameri-
can222—and much less racially polarized voting among white vot-
ers.223 According to results of the Marquette Law School polls
conducted in 2016, white voters (counting leaners) support Repub-
licans 46.5 percent compared to Democrats 44.8 percent.224 African
Americans are solidly Democratic, supporting Democrats 81.6 per-
cent compared to 8.9 percent for Republicans; Hispanics support
Democrats 60 percent, and 32 percent for Republicans.225 Wisconsin
also has less of a history of racial discrimination in voting than
states in the American South,226 and therefore, treating party as a
proxy for race in Wisconsin makes little sense. 
The Seventh Circuit, in a rather superficial analysis by Judge
Frank Easterbrook, rejected section 2 challenges to the law,227 and
there is no question that outside the American South litigating
challenges under a race as party proxy standard will be harder. It
is odd to have a rule saying that a strict voter identification law that
makes it harder for African Americans and Democrats to vote is
illegal in North Carolina but legal in Wisconsin.228
221. See, e.g., Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 745 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Frank v. Walker,
17 F. Supp. 3d 837 (E.D. Wis. 2014)).
222. See Wisconsin, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 25.
223. Email from Charles Franklin, Director of Marquette Law School, to author (Feb. 1,
2017) (on file with author).
224. Id.
225. Id. The relative numbers are not appreciably different if learners are excluded. Id.
(whites without learners are 30.3 percent Republican compared to 29.2 percent Democratic;
African Americans are 5.1 percent Republican compared to 63.7 percent Democratic).
226. Wisconsin was a free state, not a slave state, before the Civil War, see WIS. CONST. of
1848, art. I, § 2 (barring slavery except as punishment for a crime), and it granted voting
rights to African American men in 1849 (though the right was not recognized until years
later). See Black History in Wisconsin, WIS. HIST. SOC’Y, https://www.wisconsinhistory.org/
Records/Article/CS502 [https://perma.cc/6EVX-U6MQ].
227. See Frank v. Waller 768 F.3d 744, 751 (7th Cir. 2014). The Seventh Circuit divided
evenly on whether to take the case en banc, 773 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2014), and the Supreme
Court denied certiorari, 135 S. Ct. 1551 (2015).
228. For a defense, see Karlan, supra note 158, at 777-82.
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III. PARTY ALL THE TIME
A. Party All the Time
The third approach to dealing with the problem of conjoined
polarization is to litigate these cases not as race cases but as party
cases, having courts rule that certain partisan actions are them-
selves illegal. Thus, rather than making partisanship or incumbency
protection a defense in cases of racial gerrymandering, vote dilution,
or vote denial, admission of such conduct would make out a prima
facie case for liability. An admission of partisan intent would be
sufficient, though not necessary. It would be enough to show that a
law burdens voters for no good reason—and partisan advantage is
no good reason.229 I refer to this as the party all the time approach
to the conjoined polarization question.
In vote denial cases, involving voting changes such as strict voter
identification rules, cutbacks in early voting, and more onerous
registration rules, courts can rule that legislative decisions about
election administration to benefit one party or another violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.230 One way
litigants have begun framing this argument is that these laws
unconstitutionally “fence out” voters from political participation.231
This claim builds upon the Supreme Court’s 1965 decision in Car-
rington v. Rash, holding it illegal to exclude voters from an election
because the jurisdiction is worried about how those voters may
vote.232
229. I have previously expressed doubt about making bad partisan intent the basis for
liability. See generally Richard L. Hasen, Bad Legislative Intent, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 843. While
I still harbor those doubts and believe an effects-based test focused on burdens facing voters
is best, courts need not ignore admissions by legislative bodies and government entities that
they acted with the intent of burdening voters from an opposing party. Most importantly,
states should not accept an admitted partisan motivation as a defense for a law burdening
voters. 
230. See, e.g., N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 222-23 (4th Cir.
2016), cert. denied 137 S. Ct. 1399 (2017).
231. See, e.g., One Wis. Inst., Inc. v. Thomsen, 198 F. Supp. 3d 896, 927 (W.D. Wis. 2016),
appeal filed, No. 16-3083 (7th Cir. Aug. 2, 2016) (citing Aderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780,
793 (1983)).
232. 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965) (“‘Fencing out’ from the franchise a sector of the population
because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible.”).
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Although the Fourth Circuit in NC NAACP dropped a footnote
stating in dicta that “[o]f course, state legislators also cannot imper-
missibly dilute or deny the votes of opponent political parties,”233 the
fencing out claims have not met with success so far.234
Whether or not “fencing out” is the right doctrinal hook, there are
a number of ways to police laws passed to burden voters of the op-
posite party. If the state has no good reason to intentionally make
it harder for one group of voters to register and vote, courts can rec-
ognize that conduct as an equal protection violation, even under the
existing framework for evaluating such claims.
Both Professor Sam Issacharoff and I have suggested a more di-
rect focus on partisanship in vote denial cases. Professor Issacharoff
first noted the partisan valence of these laws, which he pointed out
is based upon the premise that higher voter turnout seems to help
Democrats these days:
[T]he single predictor necessary to determine whether a state
will impose voter-access restrictions is whether Republicans
control the ballot-access process. This is not intended as a norm-
ative claim, but simply as a real-world fact of life. Voting re-
strictions are not only likely to be found in Republican-controlled
jurisdictions, but are also likely to be similar in kind across
those jurisdictions. Part of this could be copying or learning from
the experiences of other states. But the similarity of these voting
restrictions in form, and their prevalence across states with sig-
nificantly different prior voting regimes and divergent dem-
ographics, points to something else. The likeliest hypothesis is
that both political parties have a similar understanding of the
relation between turnout and electoral outcomes, and both par-
ties understand voting access as a threshold determinant of
turnout.235
233. NC State Conference of NAACP, 831 F.3d at 226 n.6 (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze,
460 U.S. 780, 793 (1983)).
234. See, e.g., Feldman v. Ariz. Sec’y of State’s Office, 208 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1094 (D. Ariz.
2016).
235. Samuel Issacharoff, Ballot Bedlam, 64 DUKE L.J. 1363, 1370 (2015) (footnote omit-
ted); see also Cain & Zhang, supra note 9, at 893 (“For various reasons, minority populations
have benefited disproportionately from the flexibility that early voting and same-day reg-
istration offers.”).
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Professor Issacharoff then frames the race or party question that
arises in this context, this way:
To the conventional question whether the renewed ballot re-
strictions should be understood in terms of race or party, the
answer unfortunately is yes. Race and party are intertwined to
such a large extent that it is difficult to disentangle the two
when seeking a simple narrative of causation. But the more dif-
ficult question is a different one: How is it that a mature dem-
ocracy like the United States still allows basic rules of ballot
access to be a battleground for political skirmishing?236
His answer depends on a recognition that “the category of race
increasingly fails to capture the primary motivation for what has
become a battlefield in partisan wars,”237 and he proposed federal
legislation protecting the fairness of the electoral process from such
partisan manipulation.238 But federal legislation to protect the right
to vote from partisan manipulation seems extremely unlikely in
the near term, with a President making unsubstantiated claims of
millions of fraudulent votes cast in the 2016 election.239 Perhaps it
is a prelude to federal legislation that will match what we have seen
come out of Republican legislatures.240
A more promising route, though perhaps still a tough one given
the likely partisan trajectory of the Supreme Court, is for courts to
tighten the legal standards for judging the constitutionality of laws
making it harder to register and vote. I have argued:
When a legislature passes an election-administration law
(outside of the redistricting context) discriminating against a
236. Issacharoff, supra note 235, at 1371 (footnote omitted).
237. Id. at 1406.
238. Id. at 1407-08.
239. See Philip Bump, There Have Been Just Four Documented Cases of Voter Fraud in the
2016 Election, WASH. POST (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/
2016/12/01/0-000002-percent-of-all-the-ballots-cast-in-the-2016-election-were-fraudulent/?
utm_term=.685eec9333a6 [https://perma.cc/8RUF-SFC3].
240. Dale Ho, Trump’s Lies Pave the Way for an Assault on Voting Rights, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/26/opinion/trumps-lies-pave-the-way-for-an-
assault-on-voting-rights.html [https://perma.cc/B5WJ-3Z7Z]; Michael D. Shear & Emmarie
Huetteman, Trump Repeats Lie About Popular Vote in Meeting with Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/us/politics/donald-trump-congress-demo
crats.html?mcubz=0 [https://perma.cc/YBW9-PX3J].
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party’s voters or otherwise burdening voters, that fact should not
be a defense. Instead, courts should read the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s Equal Protection Clause to require the legislature to
produce substantial evidence that it has a good reason for bur-
dening voters and that its means are closely connected to
achieving those ends. The achievement of partisan ends would
not be considered a good reason (as it appears to be in the
redistricting context). This rule would both discourage party
power grabs and protect voting rights of minority voters. In
short, it would inhibit discrimination on the basis of both race
and party, and protect all voters from unnecessary burdens on
the right to vote.241
As noted, my proposed standard excludes redistricting, where I
have long believed that court policing of partisan gerrymandering
is too difficult because there is no way to separate permissible from
impermissible consideration of party information in redistricting.242
Professor Issacharoff, in contrast, has long favored court interven-
tion to police partisan gerrymandering.243 The issue of partisan ger-
rymandering will be especially important following the 2020 round
of redistricting: the first one without Shelby County in place to pro-
vide federal preclearance of redistricting plans in previously covered
jurisdictions.244
Recent experience with the race or party problem is causing me
to rethink my earlier opposition to court policing of partisan gerry-
mandering claims. While I remain ambivalent, it certainly seems a
more sensible approach to police partisanship in redistricting direct-
ly than to use racial gerrymandering for parties to shadowbox over
these issues. The question is whether it is possible to develop judi-
cially manageable standards to separate permissible from imper-
missible considerations of party in drawing district lines.
Cases working their way up from the lower courts to the Supreme
Court provide the best opportunity in a decade to reconsider these
241. Hasen, supra note 13, at 62; see also Richard H. Pildes, The Future of Voting Rights
Policy: From Anti-Discrimination to the Right to Vote, 49 HOW. L.J. 741, 743 (2006) (arguing
for national uniform laws to protect the right to vote).
242. Richard L. Hasen, Looking for Standards (in All the Wrong Places): Partisan Gerry-
mandering Cases after Vieth, 3 ELECTION L.J. 626, 628 (2004).
243. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV.
593, 600 (2002).
244. Cain & Zhang, supra note 9, at 884-91.
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issues.245 Most notable is a case out of Wisconsin, using the “efficien-
cy gap” measurements of Professor Nick Stephanopoulos and Eric
McGhee to argue for a standard to determine when partisanship
crosses the line into an equal protection violation.246
B. Implications and Critiques
There are two serious objections to direct policing of partisan-
ship, whether in the vote denial or redistricting context. First,
having courts determine when partisanship goes too far injects
federal court judges further into the political thicket. Whether we
are talking about vote denial or redistricting cases, it seems in-
creasingly clear that Democratic-appointed judges are much more
likely than Republican-appointed judges to be ready to police these
kinds of claims. It should be no surprise that the district court judge
in NC NAACP, who found that the law was a nondiscriminatory,
fair law, was appointed by a Republican president,247 and the Fourth
Circuit judges who saw the law as a partisan power play—which in
turn made it racially discriminatory through race as party—were all
appointed by Democratic presidents.248 That divide does not bode
well for the development of fair standards, nor is it likely to promote
public confidence in the impartiality and fairness of the judiciary.
The other concern is that by focusing on party, rather than race,
something essential about the nature of race discrimination is lost.
Professor Issacharoff, responding to Professors Samuel Bagenstos249
245. See, e.g., Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 843 (W.D. Wis. 2016), argued, No. 16-
1161 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2017).
246. See id. at 854; see also Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan
Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 850-53 (2015). The other
cases working their way up from the lower courts are from Maryland, see, for example,
Benisek v. Lamone, 266 F. Supp. 3d 799 (D. Md. 2017) (three-judge court), argued, No. 17-333
(U.S. Mar. 28, 2018), and North Carolina, see, for example, Rucho v. Common Cause, 279 F.
Supp. 3d 587 (M.D.N.C. 2018), stay granted, No. 17A745, 2018 WL 472142 (Jan. 18, 2018).
247. See Schroeder, Thomas D., FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/schroe
der-thomas-d [https://perma.cc/Z33X-U4HK].
248. See Judge Diana Gribbon Motz, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FOURTH CIR., http://www.ca4.
uscourts.gov/judges/judges-of-the-court/judge-diana-gribbon-motz [https://perma.cc/8TYV-
PWH3]; Judge Henry F. Floyd, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR FOURTH CIR., http://www.ca4.
uscourts.gov/judges/judges-of-the-court/judge-henry-f-floyd [https://perma.cc/D75S-AN6D];
Judge James A. Wynn, Jr., U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR FOURTH CIR., http://www.ca4.uscourts.
gov/judges/judges-of-the-court/judge-james-a-wynn-jr- [https://perma.cc/LC8C-2AZJ].
249. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Universalism and Civil Rights (with Notes on Voting Rights
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and Spencer Overton,250 recognized the danger that “a lowering of
the guard will reveal the unique vulnerabilities still borne by mi-
norities.”251
The critique is an important one. Recent research by Professors
Ansolabehere, Persily, and Stewart found that racially polarized
voting is increasing in those jurisdictions previously covered by
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, and it is not just about party.252
“This gap is not the result of mere partisanship, for even when con-
trolling for partisan identification, race is a statistically significant
predictor of vote choice, especially in the covered jurisdictions.”253
The data suggest it is important not to abandon litigation under
the Voting Rights Act, and to fight against the Supreme Court less-
ening the reach of section 2 of the Act through chary statutory
interpretation.254 The party all the time approach is not arguing that
racial divisions are no longer significant, but that it often will be
easier and more fruitful to try to attack the partisanship directly,
relying on the racial litigation route only as a backstop. Doing so
will lead to fewer calls for courts to declare a legislative body has a
racially discriminatory intent or that it had a predominant motive
to favor racial separation in drawing district lines. If done right, a
party all the time approach will still stop the most egregious conduct
that dilutes votes or makes it more difficult to register and vote
without raising these issues. Perhaps more accurately, in light of
race’s continued salience, we should call the approach party when
you can.
Conjoined polarization has complicated court forays into the
political thicket and the protection of the political process against
racial discrimination in voting. The three approaches to dealing
with conjoined polarization each have their problems, but party all
the time appears to present fewer problems than either treating race
and party as dichotomous and unrelated phenomena or treating all
party discrimination as a form of race discrimination in the Amer-
After Shelby), 123 YALE L.J. 2838, 2870 (2014).
250. See Spencer Overton, Voting Rights Disclosure, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 19, 23 (2013).
251. Issacharoff, supra note 235, at 1409.
252. Charles Stewart III et al., Regional Differences in Racial Polarization in the 2012
Presidential Election: Implications for the Constitutionality of Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 205, 215 (2013).
253. Id. at 206.
254. See id. at 210.
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ican South, but not necessarily elsewhere. If courts would allow
greater regulation of partisanship in the running of elections, many
of the race issues would be addressed, but in a cleaner way that
potentially avoids having to label jurisdictions as racist or making
race predominant.
Party all the time is not perfect. It keeps courts in the political
thicket, where the judges themselves may divide along party
lines.255 And it raises the danger that racial claims will not be taken
seriously enough. These are real concerns, but the approach appears
better than the alternatives.
CONCLUSION
The race or party question most recently came to a head in the
Supreme Court’s 2017 Cooper v. Harris case.256 Briefly, the Court
sharply divided 5-3 over whether a three-judge district court clearly
erred in concluding that North Carolina’s Republican legislature
drew Congressional District 12 as an unconstitutional racial gerry-
mander.257 The Court majority, in an opinion written by Justice
Kagan and joined by the Court’s other liberals and Justice Clar-
ence Thomas, concluded that the trial court did not clearly err in
deciding that race, not partisanship, predominated in the drawing
of that district.258 Justice Alito, for himself, Chief Justice Roberts,
and Justice Kennedy dissented, concluding that the trial court
clearly erred.259 Harris was the mirror image of Cromartie II, in-
volving the earlier incarnation of the same congressional district,
in which the Court’s liberals and Justice O’Connor concluded that
the trial court had clearly erred in finding that party, not race,
255. See supra text accompanying notes 247-51.
256. See generally Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017).
257. Id. at 1481-82. For a fuller analysis, see Hasen, supra note 113.
258. Harris, 137 S. Ct. at 1481-82.
259. Id. at 1486-87 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting). Justice
Neil Gorsuch, new to the Court, did not participate. Id. at 1482 (majority opinion). The dis-
senting Justices dissented only as to District 12. Id. at 1486 (Alito, J., concurring in the judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part). The Court was unanimous in holding District 1, which
the State justified as required by section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, was an unconstitutional
racial gerrymander. Id. at 1487 n.1.
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predominated.260 In both Cromartie II and Harris, Justice Thomas
voted to defer to the factual finding of the trial court.261
Much of the debate among the Justices in Harris concerned
whether Cromartie II required the plaintiffs in Harris to present an
alternative map where the same political ends could have been
achieved through a redistricting demonstrating a “significantly
greater racial balance.”262 The majority held Cromartie II did not
require this evidentiary showing, while the dissenters held it was
required and plaintiffs’ claims failed because of their absence.263
For our purposes, the most interesting part of the Kagan-Alito
dispute over District 12 concerned the question of how to deal with
conjoined polarization in North Carolina. Justice Alito, noting that
90 percent of African American voters supported Democrats, wrote
that this huge overlap meant that courts need to exert extreme
caution when analyzing racial gerrymandering claims, lest “federal
courts ... be transformed into weapons of political warfare”—as if it
were not too late for voicing that concern.264 Citing statements from
Bush v. Vera and Cromartie I, indicating that race consciousness did
not equal race predominance, Justice Alito strongly endorsed a race
or party approach to the racial gerrymandering question, with a
thumb on the scale to favor the State’s “good faith,” which Justice
Alito oddly equated with intent to engage in partisan gerrymander-
ing.265 He closely examined the State’s evidence supporting its
position that it was motivated by partisanship, and concluded that
the trial court clearly erred in finding that party, not race, predomi-
nated.266
Justice Kagan, in contrast, spent much of her majority opinion
emphasizing the deferential standard of review afforded to a fact-
ual finding of racial predominance.267 Perhaps she did so to please
260. Cromartie II, 532 U.S. 234, 239 (2001).
261. Harris, 137 S. Ct. at 1486 (Thomas, J., concurring); Cromartie II, 532 U.S. at 267
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
262. Compare Harris, 137 S. Ct. at 1480-81 (majority opinion) (rejecting the argument that
Cromartie II requires plaintiffs to show alternative map), with id. at 1486-88 (Alito, J., con-
curring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
263. Id. at 1480-81 (majority opinion); id. at 1486-90 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part) (accepting argument).
264. Id. at 1488, 1490 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
265. See id. at 1487-88, 1502-04 (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915 (1995)).
266. Id. at 1486-1504.
267. Id. at 1464-65, 1468 (majority opinion).
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Justice Thomas, a crucial fifth vote.268 But in three footnotes of great
significance, Justice Kagan moved racial gerrymandering law
significantly in the direction of the race as party proxy argument.
The Court in the first footnote declared that a plaintiff can show
racial predominance “even if the evidence reveals that a legislature
elevated race to the predominant criterion in order to advance other
goals, including political ones.”269 The Court explained in the second
footnote that “the sorting of voters on the grounds of their race re-
mains suspect even if race is meant to function as a proxy for other
(including political) characteristics.”270 Finally, in the third footnote,
the Court described reasons why redistricting authorities might
choose to employ race as a predominant redistricting factor.271
Justice Kagan offered two reasons aside from misunderstanding
Voting Rights Act requirements: “[Authorities] may resort to race-
based districting for ultimately political reasons, leveraging the
strong correlation between race and [political] behavior to advance
their partisan interests. Or, finally—though we hope less common-
ly—they may simply seek to suppress the electoral power of mi-
nority voters.”272
Like Paul Clement’s comments during the Harris oral argu-
ment,273 the Kagan approach in Harris seemed subversive of the
entire racial gerrymandering enterprise, at least when it involved
a race or party question like the one in District 12.274 With courts
recognizing that race can be a “proxy” to advance “political inter-
est[s],”275 based on “leveraging” conjoined polarization,276 it will be
much easier to argue that race, rather than party, predominate in
these cases. Partisanship will be no safe harbor, and race conscious-
ness seems easier to equate with racial predominance even when the
underlying motivation is partisan.277
268. Cf. id. at 1463.
269. Id. at 1464 n.1. The full footnote reads: “A plaintiff succeeds at this stage even if the
evidence reveals that a legislature elevated race to the predominant criterion in order to
advance other goals, including political ones.” Id. (citations omitted).
270. Id. at 1473 n.7 (citing Miller, 515 U.S. at 914).
271. Id. at 1480 n.15.
272. Id.
273. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 19-22.
274. See Harris, 137 S. Ct. at 1479-81.
275. See id. at 1464 n.1 (alteration in original) (quoting Miller, 515 U.S. at 914).
276. See id. at 1480 n.15.
277. In response to an earlier version of this Article and to a related blog post on the Harris
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The Harris opinion seemed to mark the complete transformation
of racial gerrymandering cases from a conservative tool to limit the
number of majority-minority districts into another tool used by
minority voters and their allies to attack minority voting rights.278
Less clear is whether the Harris holding will last, and here there is
some reason for doubt. The liberals lost Justice Kennedy, who had
been with them in the Alabama and Bethune-Hill racial gerryman-
dering cases,279 and they might have picked up Justice Thomas only
because of Harris’s focus on the clear error standard of review.280 In
the longer term, especially as new conservative Justices join the
Court, the Justice Alito view could be more likely to hold sway.
Indeed, while nothing is certain,281 the expected new conservative
Supreme Court could well adopt a to the victor goes the spoils ap-
proach to redistricting and voting cases generally. The Court could
reject claims of partisan gerrymandering, could reject claims of ra-
cial gerrymandering when brought by minority voters, and could
continue to reject constitutional and voting rights attacks on re-
strictive voting laws by reading the Equal Protection Clause nar-
rowly and constricting the protections of the Voting Rights Act.
case, Professor Justin Levitt protests that the three categories I put forward in this Article
are too “blunt,” and that in fact the Court’s decisions show more nuance in the treatment of
race and party questions. See Justin Levitt, NC Redistricting, from Someone Not Named Rick,
ELECTION L. BLOG (May 22, 2017, 11:44 AM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=92700 [https://
perma.cc/MB7E-F3MH]. To be clear, I do not mean that Harris stands for the proposition that
race and party are always interchangeable. But Harris demonstrates that while the courts
do not always use my terminology, in cases of conjoined polarization Court opinions have di-
vided between viewing race and party as dichotomous categories and viewing use of race as
a proxy for party.
Relatedly, Rick Pildes claims that there is nothing new in the Harris approach to the race
or party question, and that I exaggerate the extent to which Harris and the Fourth Circuit’s
NC NAACP case marks something new. Richard Pildes, Disagreeing with Rick Hasen on the
North Carolina Case, ELECTION L. BLOG (May 22, 2017, 12:06 PM), http://electionlawblog.
org/?p=92706 [https://perma.cc/G49Z-84G8]. To the contrary, the footnotes in Harris described
above show that the Court now has two conflicting strands of analysis on the race or party
question, with a Court majority appearing to adopt the proxy approach in a way it has not
before. Eventually the Court will have to resolve this tension.
278. Harris, 137 S. Ct. at 1468-69.
279. See generally Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788 (2017); Ala.
Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257 (2015).
280. See generally Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455.
281. See Richard L. Hasen, Election Law’s Path in the Roberts Court’s First Decade: A
Sharp Right Turn but with Speed Bumps and Surprising Twists, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1597, 1599
(2016) (noting that the Roberts Court was not as conservative in election law cases as the
author predicted ten years earlier).
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If all of this happens, the race or party question will not matter
to the courts for the reason that neither will be objectionable. The
Court could achieve Justice Alito’s goal of keeping courts out of fur-
ther partisan “warfare,”282 and this abdication will allow the victors
to savor their spoils and “run roughshod”283 over the rights of (po-
litical and racial) minority voters.
282. Harris, 137 S. Ct. at 1490 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
283. Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 778 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
